Is What\u27s Bad for the Goose (Tenant), Bad for the Gander (Landlord)? A Retail Real Estate Perspective by Liu, Crocker H & Liu, Peng
Cornell University School of Hotel Administration
The Scholarly Commons
Articles and Chapters School of Hotel Administration Collection
7-2013
Is What's Bad for the Goose (Tenant), Bad for the
Gander (Landlord)? A Retail Real Estate
Perspective
Crocker H. Liu
Cornell University, chl62@cornell.edu
Peng Liu
Cornell University, peng.liu@cornell.edu
Follow this and additional works at: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles
Part of the Real Estate Commons
This Article or Chapter is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Hotel Administration Collection at The Scholarly Commons. It has
been accepted for inclusion in Articles and Chapters by an authorized administrator of The Scholarly Commons. For more information, please contact
hlmdigital@cornell.edu.
Recommended Citation
Liu, C. H., & Liu, P. (2013). Is what’s bad for the goose (tenant), bad for the gander (landlord)? A retail real estate perspective
[Electronic version]. Journal of Real Estate Research, 35(3), 249-282. Retrieved [insert date], from Cornell University, School of
Hospitality Administration site:
http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/14/
Is What's Bad for the Goose (Tenant), Bad for the Gander (Landlord)? A
Retail Real Estate Perspective
Abstract
We explore the economic dependence and financial market feedback effects among firms with economic
linkages, notably landlord-tenant when shocks occur to the system. In particular, we examine 157 major
tenant bankruptcy announcements of retail real estate firms over the 2000 to 2010 period. The contracting
mechanism associated with retail leases provides several unique features such as percentage rents and co-
tenancy clauses that are absent in other type of leases. We find that in a good economy, a tenant bankruptcy
has a less negative or more positive effect on a landlord's stock return, which is consistent with the growth
option hypothesis. We also find that landlords who have properties located in markets with a highly diversified
economic base are more likely to exercise the growth option given a tenant departure and thus realize higher
stock returns.
Keywords
landlords, tenants, economic dependence, real estate, bankruptcy, retail leases
Disciplines
Real Estate
Comments
Required Publisher Statement
© American Real Estate Society. Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
This article or chapter is available at The Scholarly Commons: http://scholarship.sha.cornell.edu/articles/14
Is W h a t ' s Bad f o r t he G o o s e ( T e n a n t ) , 
Bad f o r t h e G a n d e r ( L a n d l o r d ) ? A R e t a i l 
Rea l E s t a t e P e r s p e c t i v e 
A u t h o r s Crocker Liu and Peng Liu 
A b s t r a c t We explore the economic dependence and financial market 
feedback effects among firms with economic linkages, notably 
landlord-tenant when shocks occur to the system. In particular, 
we examine 157 major tenant bankruptcy announcements of 
retail real estate firms over the 2000 to 2010 period. The 
contracting mechanism associated with retail leases provides 
several unique features such as percentage rents and co-tenancy 
clauses that are absent in other type of leases. We find that in a 
good economy, a tenant bankruptcy has a less negative or more 
positive effect on a landlord's stock return, which is consistent 
with the growth option hypothesis. We also find that landlords 
who have properties located in markets with a highly diversified 
economic base are more likely to exercise the growth option 
given a tenant departure and thus realize higher stock returns. 
Financial market feedback effects between economically linked firms in the 
economy are of broad interest. Some economic links are direct and contractual, 
such as landlord-tenant or customer-supplier relationships, while others are 
indirect and implicit. These effects are elevated during periods of financial distress. 
Using contractual relationships between landlord and tenants in the retail real 
estate setting, we study economic dependence and financial market feedback 
between firms with economic linkages. We focus on the stock market responses 
of real estate owners [real estate investment trusts (REITs)] following bankruptcy 
announcements by their major tenants. With rental payments contracted in 
commercial leases, the departure of a major tenant will result in a direct loss of 
revenue for a property owner. However, the owner's stock return is far from a 
one-to-one mapping to revenue contributions. The owner's financial distress may 
be contagious among tenants in a retail center due to shocks involving macro-
and local economic conditions. The owner may suffer higher revenue losses from 
overage-rent payments or a domino effect from the exercise of contingent lease 
provisions if the bankrupted tenant is an anchor. If, in contrast, the tenant 
bankruptcy is a result of industry competition, the owner may benefit from the 
wealth effect when re-tenanting the vacated space to rivals of the failed tenant. 
By replacing the old lease (very likely at below-market rents), the owner can 
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achieve revenue growth through leasing the space at market rent to the rival 
survivors who may have gained greater market share. 
Prior research in this area examines the intra-industry valuation consequences of 
firm bankruptcy, but provides little evidence pertaining to stock market feedback 
effects vis-a-vis the links involved in landlord-tenant relationships in the retail real 
estate setting. Lang and Stulz (1992) is one of the first studies to empirically 
investigate contagion and the competitive intra-industry effects of bankruptcy 
announcements. The industry contagion effect arises because the adverse 
performance of a distressed firm should impact all firms that share similar cash 
flow characteristics. In addition, however, a bankruptcy announcement may 
indicate that a firm is doing poorly relative to its industry rivals; in that case, 
competitors benefit via a wealth re-distribution effect. Overall, Lang and Stulz 
(1992) documented that bankruptcy announcements decrease the value of a value-
weighted portfolio of competitors by 1%. Consistent with this view, Ferris, 
Jayaraman, and Makhija (1997), Slovin, Sushka, and Polonchek (1999), and Kang 
and Stulz (2000) find similar results using samples taken from commercial banks 
in the United States, with matched firms using subsequent bankruptcies as a proxy 
for contagion, and Japanese firms, respectively. Two recent publications broaden 
the investigation of the intra-industry effect of bankruptcy by examining the wealth 
effect of distress and bankruptcy filing for suppliers and customers of filing firms. 
Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers (2008) find that neither suppliers nor customers 
appear to be significantly impaired by the competitive benefits of a filing firm's 
bankruptcy. Cohen and Frazzini (2008) suggest that customer-supplier links in a 
firm's product market are not fully transmitted to the financial market. Buying 
(selling) a supplier firm following a positive (negative) shock to its customers 
results in predictable return. The authors attribute such predictable abnormal return 
to investors' limited attention. 
Real estate owners, who lease retail space to tenant firms from various industries, 
present a unique opportunity to study the announcement effect associated with 
firm bankruptcies. The owners of shopping centers are incentivized to exercise 
their flexibility for selecting tenants and thus create an optimal tenant mix. 
Therefore, an owner firm's performance should be affected by the joint intra-
industry effect of contagion and competition from several industries that rely on 
retail stores to market their products. Retail leases exhibit several features, such 
as percentage rents and contingency provisions, that are not found in leases for 
other property types. In contrast to a typical real estate lease contract, which 
provides for a fixed rental payment between landlord and tenant, retail tenants pay 
a percentage of their gross sales as rent in addition to the base rent (Benjamin, 
1993; Cotwell and Munneke, 1998; Benjamin and Chinloy, 2004; and Williams, 
2011). It is widely recognized in the literature that stores in shopping centers 
generate business traffic or sales externality involving other retail tenants, as 
customers practice "complementary" or "comparison" shopping (Eaton and 
Lipsey, 1979; and Wolinsky, 1983). On the one hand, a percentage rent provides 
a risk-sharing mechanism with which to address business uncertainty (Miceli and 
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Sirmans, 1995) and better aligns incentives between tenant and landlord 
(Brueckner, 1993; Lee, 1995). On the other hand, a percentage lease contract 
creates business interdependence. A key tenant bankruptcy or store closure can 
significantly affect a landlord's performance. Ex ante, it is unclear which effect 
dominates if an anchor or key tenant departs from a retail center, since this also 
affords the landlord with a growth option: the opportunity to adjust rents to market. 
If a landlord is able to lease a space to an equivalent tenant survivor or to a 
higher-quality anchor through competition, then the landlord should experience a 
positive stock market reaction. By 'higher quality,' we mean that the key tenant 
generates more traffic and hence greater drawing power for the retail center and 
has an equivalent or higher tenant credit rating. On the other hand, a landlord's 
common stock should decline if the market perceives that the landlord is either 
unable to re-lease the space or the replacement anchor is of inferior quality due 
to an industry contagion effect. To examine abnormal returns on REIT common 
stocks, we utilize prior- and post-press release date data on public companies that 
have experienced major tenant bankruptcies, as well as major private store 
closures.1 
We use an event study approach to investigate the impact of a major tenant's 
Chapter 11 bankruptcy filing on a landlord by observing the movements of the 
landlord's stock.2 In aggregate, we find significant negative abnormal returns that 
are robust across various model specifications using a sample of 157 tenant 
bankruptcy events from 2000 to 2010 in the U.S. We also find a substantial 
increase in the risk associated with and variations in landlord stock prices, which 
confirms the practitioners' wisdom that Chapter 11 bankruptcy filings create a 
significant amount of uncertainty for landlords regarding store closures under 
tenant reorganization. Cross-sectional analyses reveal that the local economic base 
of a landlord's market plays an important role in determining whether the growth 
option exists. A multivariate OLS regression shows that such abnormal returns are 
positively associated with broad industry diversification of a local economic base, 
and negatively associated with the anchor tenant dummy, conditional on the level 
of tenant exposure. 
The T e n a n t - La n d l o r d F e e d b a c k E f f e c t s 
To study the impact of major tenant bankruptcies on the stock performance of 
their former landlords, we identify the following feedback effects. 
Direct Effect from Tenant Revenue Losses 
Retail landlords suffer when a tenant files for bankruptcy, first losing rental 
revenue on the space the retailer occupies, then being forced to find replacement 
tenants. Such a threat to a landlord's revenue can have an immediate impact on 
the landlord's stock price, as evidenced in the following news examples: 
• Developers Diversified Realty Corp., Kimco Realty Corp., and General 
Growth Properties Inc. were among retail landlords that fell in New York 
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trading after Circuit City Stores Inc. filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy 
protection. Developers Diversified, based in Beachwood, Ohio, fell $2.37, 
or 25 percent, to $7.25 in New York Stock Exchange composite trading. 
New Hyde Park, New York-based Kimco Realty Corp., the largest U.S. 
owner of community shopping centers, fell $2.01, or 9.6 percent, to $19. 
Chicago-based General Growth fell 70 cents, or 34 percent, to $1.37.— 
Bloomberg, November 10, 2008. 
• Malan Realty Investors, Inc. (NYSE: MAL), a self-administered REIT, 
provided information today on its exposure to Kmart Corporation 
(NYSE: KM) and the potential impact of Kmart's bankruptcy filing on 
the Company's operating results for 2002. Malan has 27 properties leased 
to Kmart and derives approximately 25 percent of its annualized base 
rents from Kmart.—Malan Realty Investors, Inc. Press Release, January 
22, 2002. 
• Malan Realty Investors, Inc. . . . said its board voted to sell the company's 
58 shopping center assets and liquidate the company. Malan . . . leases 
more space to the bankrupt retailer Kmart than all but two other real 
estate investment trusts. The company's shares have fallen 43 percent 
over the last 12 months.—The New York Times, March 21, 2002. 
The magnitude of a landlord's stock market response may vary depending on the 
severity of the exposure represented by a troubled tenant. A landlord with greater 
tenant exposure (i.e., a higher percentage of revenue generated from the 
bankrupted tenant) will experience a stronger response. A landlord with a more 
diversified set of tenants will tend to be more resilient to shocks caused by the 
loss of any particular tenant. 
The Growth Option with Tenant Competitive Effects 
With a well-diversified tenant base, a landlord has only limited revenue exposure 
to the anchor tenant. Furthermore, a given regional mall may have more than 200 
tenants but the most notable—the anchors—typically pay little if any rent. Such 
anchors and other tenants with "brand"-drawing power not only pay less base 
rent, they also tend to pay a lower percentage of their sales in rent (Wheaton, 
2000). 
Furthermore, store closures may benefit landlords. If a tenant bankruptcy is a 
consequence of industry competition, wealth will be re-distributed within the 
industry, with little loss of total industry market value. The landlord should be 
indifferent to or even welcome the prospect of signing new leases with rival firms 
who win the competition and expand their market shares. Despite numerous big-
box store closings and chain liquidations, stronger retailers have been re-leasing 
vacated locations as second-generation space. Retail landlords may take this 
opportunity to replace below-market rents contracted several years earlier with 
new tenants who are in an expansion mode. 
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For example, prior to 2009, Indianapolis-based HHGregg was a regional 
electronics chain that few shoppers outside of the Midwest had heard of. The 
chain saw the opportunity presented by the glut of big-box space and took 
advantage of it to grow into a national player. Colliers International (2010) reports 
that HHGregg opened more than 30 stores over an 18-month period, and planned 
to open 45 more in 2011. The majority of these new locations formerly housed 
Circuit City, the failed electronics giant. Other tenants that have actively signed 
leases recently include Kohl's, Dollar Tree, Buybuy Baby, Express, and Giant. 
The termination of old leases not only provides a landlord with an opportunity to 
mark rents to market, but it also provides some flexibility by keeping the growth 
option alive, as evidenced below. 
At neighborhood and community center REITs, strong leasing velocity 
at its centers resulted in a 30 bps increase in occupancy to 94.5% over 
the second quarter. 
Tanger was among those who lead the industry, producing an average 
increase on executed renewal of 18.3% compared to 13.6% last year. 
The figure on new leases/re-tenanting is even stronger—a 43% increase 
in base rent over what the previous tenant was paying. 
Store closures at Tanger's outlet centers seems to benefit the REIT, if 
it can keep up its pace of leasing. REIT has provided some relief to 
retailers over the last quarter, granting underperforming retailers several 
short-term renewals at their current terms with the goal of maintaining 
occupancy in the near term while providing us the flexibility to re-lease 
these spaces in a more favorable economic environment.—CoStar 
Report, November 12, 2008. 
It is worth noting that exercising the growth option is rather complicated. Retailers 
selectively target the best available locations. This suggests that stores in an 
expansion mode will locate in areas that have growing local economies to achieve 
sales growth. There continues to be demand for space in better quality locations, 
with more modest pressure on rents. Retail chains capitalize on the opportunity 
to upgrade by increasing their store size in high-quality malls that offer either 
high sales per square foot or a high traffic count. However, bankrupt tenants under 
a Chapter 11 reorganization plan will try to keep the more profitable stores open. 
These open stores are likely located in better locations or have lower rents. 
Contagion and the Anchor Tenant Amplification Effect 
For most retail landlords, a particular tenant may account for only a small portion 
of the total revenue that they receive from other performing tenants. The direct 
revenue loss from such a bankrupt tenant is thus limited for a well-diversified 
landlord. However, store closures and tenant liquidations affect landlords in a 
meaningful way due to non-contractual contagion effects and contractual tenant 
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dependency provisions such as co-tenancy and kick-out clauses. The contagion 
effect is the sum of adverse consequences when one tenant's action spreads 
throughout the industry, which implies a positive default correlation.3 
Extensive evidence exists of the intra-industry contagion effect of Chapter 11 
bankruptcies on the stock market (Lang and Stulz, 1992; Slovin, Sushka, and 
Polonchek, 1997; and Hertzel, Li, Officer, and Rodgers, 2008). For example, in 
2002, the telecommunication sector accounted for 56% of all corporate 
bankruptcies in terms of dollar debt defaulted. During the 2007-2009 crisis, 
similar contagious bankruptcies occurred in the financial industry. The 
explanations for the contagion effect include but are not limited to the following: 
(1) financial distress across companies is driven by common economic factors 
within an industry (Das, Duffie, Kapadia, and Saita, 2007); (2) the default of one 
firm causes financial distress on other firms with which the first firm has close 
business ties (Jarrow and Yu, 2001); and (3) updating of beliefs occurs when 
investors learn from other defaults. For example, the failure of Enron led investors 
to reassess their views of the quality of accounting information from other firms 
(Collin-Dufresne, Goldstein, and Helwege, 2003). 
Generally, a "contagion effect" implies positive default correlations. A more 
relevant example in the retail industry is that of video rental stores. Immediately 
following reports that bankrupt retailer Movie Gallery (which also owns 
Hollywood Video) planned to liquidate its remaining 2,000-plus stores in early 
May 2010, shopping center landlords put the entire video rental segment on their 
watchlists. Blockbuster (another video rental store) then filed for Chapter 11 
bankruptcy on September 23, 2010. 
The failure of an anchor tenant may have an amplifying or domino effect due to 
the exercise of contingent provisions in the retail lease contracts such as co-
tenancy and kick-out clauses. Having long been a part of modern shopping center 
development and retail leasing strategies, a co-tenancy clause allows tenants to 
demand reductions in rent or a penalty-free pullout if key tenants or a specified 
number of stores (based on an occupancy threshold) leave a retail center. The 
rationale supporting a tenant request is simple enough: Tenants rely on certain 
anchors or other national or regional tenants to draw customers to the center, as 
well as a certain mix of tenants having similar customer demographics to increase 
their visibility and sales.4 
The risk created by the domino effect of lease terminations or reduced rent that 
might arise from an anchor tenant departure can be catastrophic. This ripple effect 
is especially troubling in turbulent times when it is hard to re-lease a space to 
other tenants (Rosenfeldt, 2009). Using shopping center data from Florida and 
Georgia, Gatzlaff, Sirmans, and Diskin (1994) estimate that the loss of an anchor 
tenant results in a 27% rent rate decline for the remaining tenants. The bankruptcy 
of an anchor tenant may thus trigger a chain reaction of lease terminations or rent 
reductions among smaller retailers and lead to a collectively larger revenue loss 
to the landlord. 
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The D a t a a n d D e s c r i p t i v e A n a l y s i s 
The data used in this study, some of which are hand-collected, come from several 
sources. First we obtain a list of retail real estate companies from SNL. The REIT 
sector accounts for the majority of the retail real estate business. Another 
advantage of using REITs is that financial and tenant information on REITs is 
transparent. In Exhibit 1 we list all the retail REITs used in this study, including 
defunct firms. There are 73 firms, among which 32 are current REITs and 41 are 
historical REITs. We manually match the relation between landlord REITs and 
their tenants. REIT stock returns and REIT index returns between 2000 and 2010 
are obtained from the CRSP/Ziman database, with corresponding REIT 
accounting data taken from Compustat and SNL. We obtain a list of top tenants 
of each REIT from SNL. A tenant is included in the top tenant list if the aggregate 
rents to be paid to the landlord company by the tenant as a percentage of the total 
rents are equal or greater than 0.20%. Tenant information includes contractual 
relations between landlord REIT firms and their tenants, number of leases, 
percentage of revenue, and percentage of square feet for each tenant. 
We collect bankruptcy announcements from two sources. Public bankruptcy filings 
are obtained from the Bankruptcy Research Database at the UCLA law school. 
Private retailer bankruptcy data are hand-collected from various industry reports: 
J.P. Morgan, Morgan Stanley, Deutsche Bank, Colliers International, CoStar, 
International Shopping Center Council, ULI, etc. 
The public bankruptcy database includes all Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases filed by 
or against a debtor group that: (1) has assets worth $100 million or more at the 
time of filing, measured in 1980 dollars, and (2) is required to file 10-Ks with the 
SEC. A total of 907 major public firms filed for Chapter 11 reorganization between 
1980 and 2010. Exhibit 2 shows time variations in bankruptcy filings by industry. 
We select Chapter 11 bankruptcy cases according to the following rules: (1) The 
bankruptcy was filed after 1999, because REIT tenant exposure information is not 
available prior to 2000; and (2) the tenant leased real estate space from at least 
one REIT landlord before filing under Chapter 11. Exhibit 3 demonstrates the 
total number of bankruptcy filings across industries and across years in the sample. 
The total numbers of private defunct retailers vary by industry sector (Exhibit 4) 
and those of defunct department stores vary by state (Exhibit 5). From the 681 
defunct retailers in the U.S. who have closed their doors since 1950, we match 
private retailers that liquidated after 1999. We match the top tenants reported in 
SNL to identify bankrupt private retailers who were the top tenants of at least one 
publicly traded REIT. The final sample contains 157 tenant-landlord matches with 
tenant bankruptcy announcements. 
E m p i r i c a l M e t h o d o l o g y 
Our primary emphasis is on the announcement day effect, although we report 
measures of abnormal performance for various sub-periods between day -90 and 
J R E R I V o l . 3 5 I N o . 3 - 2 0 1 3 
2 5 6 L i u a n d L i u 
Exhibit 1 | List of Retail REITs 
Company Name Ticker Current 
Property 
Focus IPO Date 
Assets as of 
2010:Q3 
(in $ 1000s) 
Panel A: List of current retail REITs 
Alexander's, Inc. 
CBL & Associates 
Properties, Inc. 
Feldman Mall 
Properties, Inc. 
General Growth 
Properties, Inc. 
Glimcher Realty Trust 
Macerich Company 
Pennsylvania REIT 
Simon Property 
Group, Inc. 
Taubman Centers, 
Inc. 
Tanger Factory Outlet 
Centers, Inc. 
Agree Realty 
Corporation 
Getty Realty Corp. 
National Retail 
Properties, Inc. 
One Liberty 
Properties, Inc. 
Realty ncome 
Corporation 
Acadia Realty Trust 
Cedar Shopping 
Centers, Inc. 
Developers 
Diversified Realty 
Equity One, Inc. 
ALX 
CBL 
FMLP 
GGP 
GRT 
MAC 
PEI 
SPG 
TCO 
SKT 
ADC 
GTY 
NNN 
OLP 
O 
AKR 
CDR 
DDR 
EQY 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Outlet 
Center 
Single 
Tenant 
Single 
Tenant 
Single 
Tenant 
Single 
Tenant 
Single 
Tenant 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
7 /19 /1984 
10/27/1993 
12/15/2004 
4 /8 /1993 
1/19/1994 
3 /9 /1994 
12/27/1960 
12/13/1993 
11/20/1992 
6 /4 /1993 
4 /22 /1994 
9/30/1971 
10/9 /1984 
12/20/1982 
8 /15/1994 
5/27/1993 
11/25/1986 
2 /3 /1993 
5/13/1998 
1,717,662 
7,615,480 
148,836 
27,742,933 
1,741,615 
7,699,522 
3,093,861 
24,788,287 
2,529,676 
1,197,559 
274,057 
428,108 
2,609,755 
416,915 
3,285,534 
1,490,748 
1,647,104 
7,877,079 
2,570,370 
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E x h i b i t 1 | (continued) 
List of Retail REITs 
Company Name 
Excel Trust, Inc. 
Federal Realty 
Investment Trust 
Inland Real Estate 
Corporation 
Kimco Realty 
Corporation 
Kite Realty Group 
Trust 
Ra mco-Gershen son 
Properties 
Regency Centers 
Corporation 
Retail Opportunity 
Investments 
Roberts Realty 
Investors, Inc. 
Saul Centers, Inc. 
Urstadt Biddle 
Properties Inc. 
Weingarten Realty 
Investors 
Whitestone REIT 
Panel B: List of defunct 
Company Name 
Arbor Property Trust 
Crown American 
Realty Trust 
DeBartolo Realty 
Corporation 
EQK Realty Investors 1 
Ticker 
EXL 
FRT 
IRC 
KIM 
KRG 
RPT 
REG 
ROIC 
RPI 
BFS 
UBA 
WRI 
WSR 
retail REITs 
Ticker 
ABR 
CWN 
N / A 
N / A 
Current 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Yes 
Current 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Property 
Focus 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Property 
Focus 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
IPO Date 
4 / 2 2 / 2 0 1 0 
9 / 1 0 / 1 9 6 2 
8 / 1 4 / 2 0 0 2 
1 1 / 2 2 / 1 9 9 1 
8 / 1 0 / 2 0 0 4 
5 / 3 1 / 1 9 9 6 
1 0 / 2 9 / 1 9 9 3 
1 0 / 1 7 / 2 0 0 7 
1 2 / 9 / 1 9 9 7 
8 / 1 9 / 1 9 9 3 
7 / 6 / 1 9 6 9 
8 / 1 6 / 1 9 8 5 
8 / 2 5 / 2 0 1 0 
IPO Date 
2 / 2 8 / 1 9 9 4 
8 / 9 / 1 9 9 3 
4 / 1 4 / 1 9 9 4 
3 / 1 2 / 1 9 8 5 
i 
Assets as of 
2010:Q3 
(in $ 1000s) 
318,230 
3,127,159 
1,232,183 
9,814,508 
1,133,219 
1,010,821 
3,993,674 
428,304 
69,727 
970,464 
548,926 
4,810,081 
198,365 
Defunct Date 
1 2 / 1 8 / 1 9 9 7 
1 1 / 2 0 / 2 0 0 3 
8 / 9 / 1 9 9 6 
8 / 2 9 / 2 0 0 0 
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E x h i b i t 1 j (continued) 
List of Retail REITs 
Company Name 
JP Realty, Inc. 
Mills Corporation 
Rouse Company 
Urban Shopping 
Centers, Inc. 
Chelsea Property 
Group, Inc. 
Horizon Group 
Properties, Inc. 
McArthur/Glen 
Realty Corp. 
Prime Retail, Inc. 
JDN Realty 
Corporation 
Price REIT, Inc. 
Aegis Realty, Inc. 
AmREIT 
Atlantic Realty Trust 
Bradley Real Estate, 
Inc. 
Burnham Pacific 
Properties, Inc. 
Center Trust, Inc. 
Excel Realty Trust, 
Inc. 
First Washington 
Realty Trust, Inc. 
Heritage Property 
Investment Trust 
Ticker 
JPR 
MLS 
ROUS 
URB 
CCG 
HGPI 
N /A 
PRME 
JDN 
N / A 
AER 
AMY 
ATLRS 
BRLY 
BPAC 
ACH 
N / A 
FRW 
HTG 
Current 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Property 
Focus 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Regional 
Mall 
Outlet 
Center 
Outlet 
Center 
Outlet 
Center 
Outlet 
Center 
Power 
Center 
Power 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
IPO Date 
1 / 1 3 / 1 9 9 4 
4 / 2 1 / 1 9 9 4 
1/15/1957 
10/14/1993 
10/26/1993 
11/8/1993 
10/21/1993 
3 /15/1994 
3 /29/1994 
12/3/1991 
10/10/1997 
7 /23/2002 
5/14/1996 
1/27/1961 
1/15/1987 
12/27/1993 
8 /4 /1993 
6 /27/1995 
4 /23 /2002 
1 
Defunct Date 
7 /10/2002 
4 / 2 / 2 0 0 7 
11/12/2004 
11/7/2000 
10/14/2004 
12/10/2003 
7/17/1995 
9/26/2001 
3/13/2003 
6/22/1998 
3/26/2003 
12/19/2008 
3/31/2006 
9 /18/2000 
6 /27/2002 
1/17/2003 
9/29/1998 
2/28/2001 
10/5/2006 
A R e t a i l R e a l E s t a t e P e r s p e c t i v e I 2 5 9 
E x h i b i t 1 | (continued) 
List of Retail REITs 
Company Name 
IRT Property 
Company 
Konover Property 
Trust, Inc. 
Kramont Realty Trust 
Kranzco Realty Trust 
Malan Realty 
Investors, Inc. 
Mid-America Realty 
Investments, Inc. 
Mid-Atlantic Realty 
Trust 
MSA Realty 
Corporation 
New Plan Excel 
Realty Trust, Inc. 
Pan Pacific Retail 
Properties, Inc. 
Philips International 
Realty 
Price Legacy 
Corporation 
Tucker Properties 
Corporation 
United Investors 
Realty Trust 
USP Real Estate 
Investment Trust 
Western Properties 
Trust 
Westfield America, 
Inc. 
Ticker 
IRT 
FAC 
KRT 
KRT 
MAL 
N / A 
BTRI 
N / A 
NXL 
PNP 
PHR 
PLRE 
N / A 
UIRT 
URT 
WIR 
WEA 
Current 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
No 
Property 
Focus 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
Shopping 
Center 
IPO Date 
4 / 2 9 / 1 9 7 1 
6 / 3 / 1 9 9 3 
1 2 / 2 9 / 1 9 8 8 
1 1 / 1 2 / 1 9 9 2 
6 / 1 6 / 1 9 9 4 
1 2 / 3 0 / 1 9 8 6 
9 / 1 1 / 1 9 9 3 
3 / 2 9 / 1 9 8 4 
7 / 1 / 1 9 6 2 
8 / 7 / 1 9 9 7 
5 / 7 / 1 9 9 8 
1 2 / 2 1 / 1 9 9 4 
1 0 / 5 / 1 9 9 3 
3 / 1 0 / 1 9 9 8 
4 / 2 5 / 1 9 7 8 
6 / 1 3 / 1 9 8 4 
5 / 1 5 / 1 9 9 7 
Defunct Date 
2 / 1 2 / 2 0 0 3 
1 1 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 2 
4 / 1 8 / 2 0 0 5 
6 / 1 6 / 2 0 0 0 
8 / 2 7 / 2 0 0 4 
8 / 6 / 1 9 9 8 
1 0 / 1 / 2 0 0 3 
9 / 8 / 1 9 9 4 
4 / 2 0 / 2 0 0 7 
1 0 / 3 0 / 2 0 0 6 
1 0 / 2 2 / 2 0 0 2 
1 2 / 2 1 / 2 0 0 4 
3 / 1 8 / 1 9 9 6 
9 / 2 1 / 2 0 0 1 
6 / 1 5 / 2 0 0 0 
1 1 / 1 3 / 2 0 0 0 
1 0 / 1 / 2 0 0 1 
Notes: Exhibit 1 lists all REITs with property focus on the retail real estate sector, including regional 
malls, shopping centers, outlets, and other retail properties. Panel A lists all current REITs as of the 
year end of 2010. Panel B lists all defunct REITs. Information on IPO date and total assets (in 
thousands) as of 2010:Q3 are from SNL. 
J R E R I V o l . 3 5 I N o . 3 - 2 0 1 3 
2 6 0 L i u a n d L i u 
E x h i b i t 2 [ Chapter 1 1 Bankruptcy Filing Distribution by Year: 1980 -2010 
• Mining •Construction • Manufacturing •Transportation •Wholesale * Retail Trade • Finance, Insurance and Real Estate 3 Services 
Exhibit 2 presents historical Chapter 1 1 bankruptcy cases in the U.S. filed during 1980 -2010 . The data are 
from a bankruptcy research database (BRD) compiled by Lynn LoPucki at UCLA. The BRD contains all Chapter 1 1 
bankruptcy cases filed by companies that 11) have assets worth $ 100 million or more at the time of filing, measured 
in 1980 dollars, and (2| are required to file 10-Ks with the SEC. The total number of bankruptcy filings is further 
decomposed by industry: Mining, Construction, Manufacturing, Transportation, Communications and Utilities, 
Whole sale, Retail Trade, Finance, Insurance and Real Estate, and Services. 
day +30. The impact of a major tenant bankruptcy announcement on a REIT's 
stock price is estimated using abnormal performance over the event window. We 
define the following timing sequence: event date, t = 0, as the date of the tenant 
bankruptcy filing; the event window as 7, + 1 to T2; and the pre-bankruptcy 
estimation window as T0+1 to Tv The timing sequence is illustrated on the time 
line in Exhibit 6. We interpret abnormal returns and volatilities over the event 
window as measures of the impact of a tenant bankruptcy event on the value of 
the REIT. 
Measurement of Abnormal Performance 
We present two types of evidence on abnormal returns following a tenant 
bankruptcy event. First, we calculate cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) after 
bankruptcy using several time horizons (Campbell, Lo, and Mackinlay, 1997; and 
Brown and Warner, 1980). Second, we present results using buy-and-hold returns 
(BHARs), as this is a better method for calculating long-run abnormal returns, 
reflecting the compounding of long-run returns (Barber and Lyon, 1997). 
A R e t a i l R e a l E s t a t e P e r s p e c t i v e I 2 6 1 
E x h i b i t 3 | Chapter 1 1 Bankruptcy Filings by REITs' Public Tenants: 1 9 9 9 - 2 0 1 0 
Panel A: Public Tenant Bankruptcy by Industry 
4% 
• 
• 
a 
Construction 
Manufacturing 
Transportation, Communications, 
Utility 
a Wholesale Trade 
• 
• 
• 
Retail Trade 
Finance, insurance 
Services 
Real Estate 
Panel B: Public Tenant Bankruptcy by Year 
1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Exhibit 3 presents the total number of bankruptcy cases filed by public tenants of REITs from 1999 to 2010. Panel 
A is percentage of Chapter 1 1 filings by industry. Panel B is total number of bankruptcy filings by year. 
CAR Estimation: There are several return-generating processes used in the 
literature for calculating the return on a given security. The most commonly-used 
approaches in the finance literature are (1) the constant mean return model, which 
calculates abnormal return as the difference between the realized return on security 
i in period t and the mean return on the same security over the normal performance 
period (Brown and Warner, 1980, 1985); and (2) the market model, which we 
J R E R V o l . 3 5 N o 2 0 1 3 
2 6 2 L i u a n d L 
E x h i b i t 4 | Private Defunct Retailers in the U.S. by Industry: 1 9 5 0 - 2 0 1 0 
• Automotive 
• Catalog showrooms 
• Clothing, shoes, & specialty stores 
• Drug stores 
• Electronics stores 
• Five Ant) Dime / Variety stores 
• Furniture stores 
• Grocery stores and supermarkets 
s Home Improvement 
• Home decor, and craft stores 
• Musicand Video Stores (Records, Tapes, 
Books, CDs, DVDs, etc.) 
i Office supply stores 
• Camping, sports or athletic stores 
• Warehouse clubs and membership 
department stores 
Exhibit 4 indicates shares of private defunct retailers in the United States by industry. Across the U.S. a large 
number of local stores and retail chains became defunct during the 1950s, when modern shopping centers were 
introduced, and the 1980s, when many chains were either consolidated or liquidated. Some have been lost due 
to mergers. 
describe in detail below. We present results for both the constant return model 
and the CAR model. 
In summary, the CAR estimate for a period of length r is the sum of the average 
abnormal returns for the sample securities as in the following formula: 
Depending on how the normal performance is measured, E(Rit) takes different 
forms. The constant return model uses the constant mean return for the specific 
security of interest while the market model uses the projected value from a market 
model regression. 
BHAR Estimation: The CAR on the BHAR is calculated as the return on a buy-
and-hold investment in a firm less the return on a buy-and-hold investment in a 
portfolio with an appropriate expected return: 
A R e t a i l R e a l E s t a t e P e r s p e c t i v e I 2 6 3 
E x h i b i t 5 | Defunct Department Stores in the U.S. by State: 1950 -2010 
Exhibit 5 presents the number of defunct department stores in the U.S. The stores range from small-town one-unit 
stores to big city mega-chains that have disappeared over the past 100 years, including both traditional depart-
ment stores and discount stores. This list excludes 86 department stores that involved with Federated and May. 
Many department stores went out of business or lost their identities between 1990 and 2005 as a result of a 
complex series of corporate mergers and acquisitions that were involved Federated Department Stores and The 
May Department Stores Company and that resulted in many stores becoming units of Macy's, Inc. 
J R E R V o l . 3 5 N o 2 0 1 3 
2 6 4 L i u a n d L i u 
E x h i b i t 6 | Time Line for Bankruptcy Event Study 
T0=-
Estimation Window 
30 « " 
Event Window 
-30 0 T2 
Bankruptcy 
Filing Date 
Post-event Window 
=+30 r: =+90 
BHARiT = n ,= i [1 + /?/,] - E t - i [1 + E(Rit)l (2) 
We use the value-weighted REIT index return, Rml, as appropriate expected return 
instead of the NYSE/AMEX/NASDAQ market index return. The returns on three 
CRSP/Ziman indices—All REITs, Equity REITs, and Retail REITs—are used as 
benchmark returns in the BHAR estimation. 
Recent methodological studies disagree on the best method for calculating 
abnormal returns (e.g., Barber and Lyon, 1997). However, it seems that both CARs 
and BHARs have their strengths and can be considered as complementary rather 
than competing approaches in computing abnormal returns (Dichev and Piotroski, 
2001). The difference between the CARs and BHARs results from the effect of 
compounding. CARs ignore compounding, while BHARs do not. If individual 
security returns are more volatile than the returns on the market index are, CARs 
will be greater than BHARs. Ritter (1991) was among the first to argue that CARs 
and BHARs can be used to answer different questions. 
Cross-sectional Analysis of Abnormal Performance 
In the results that follow, we employ multivariate regressions to explain cross-
sectional variation in abnormal returns in post-bankruptcy periods. We are 
interested in what factors determine such cross-sectional variation in CARs. Liu, 
Liu, and Zhang (2010) provide the theory and evidence linking a REIT's value to 
its asset quality. They find that an asset's tenant quality and local economic base 
determine the firm value of a REIT. We predict that the size of a landlord's 
exposure to distressed tenants will have a negative effect. The larger is the 
percentage of a REIT's revenue that comes from a bankrupt tenant, the bigger the 
impact of tenant bankruptcy will be. 
Another significant determinant of REIT value is industry diversification of a local 
economic base. In our analysis, we use an average industry diversification ratio 
of a REIT's top markets. Each local market is defined as a Metropolitan Statistical 
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E x h i b i t 7 | (continued] 
Average CARs under Constant Return Model and Market Model 
Constant Return Model Market Model 
Trading Days 
+ 11 
+ 12 
+ 13 
+ 14 
+ 15 
+ 16 
+ 17 
+ 18 
+ 19 
+ 20 
+ 21 
+ 22 
+23 
+24 
AR 
-0.135 
0.055 
-0.450 
-1.108 
0.403 
0.602 
0.225 
0.040 
1.818 
-0.363 
-0.207 
-0.964 
1.195 
-0.814 
CAR 
-6.281 
-6.227 
-6.677 
-7.785 
-7.382 
-6.781 
-6.556 
-6.516 
-4.698 
-5.061 
-5.268 
-6.232 
-5.037 
-5.851 
AR 
0.208 
-0.203 
0.101 
-0.641 
0.003 
0.135 
0.487 
-0.344 
0.765 
-0.034 
-0.078 
-0.325 
0.149 
-0.093 
CAR 
-2.519 
-2.722 
-2.621 
-3.262 
-3.260 
-3.125 
-2.637 
-2.982 
-2.217 
-2.251 
-2.330 
-2.654 
-2.506 
-2.599 
Notes: Exhibit 7 presents the average percentage abnormal return (AR) and cumulative abnormal 
return (CAR; from - 3 0 trading days before the event) for various trading-day windows. The 
constant return model uses the constant mean of the historical return as the normal performance 
for the security of interest. The market model uses the fitted value from a market model regression 
as normal performance. 
Area (MSA). The United States Office of Management and Budget (OMB) defines 
an MSA as one or more adjacent counties or county equivalents that have at least 
one urban core area of at least 50,000 people, plus adjacent territory that has a 
high degree of social and economic integration with the core, as measured by 
commuting ties. The OMB has defined 366 MSAs in the U.S. For example, the 
New York metropolitan area (the New York-Northern New Jersey-Long Island 
MSA), which is the largest MSA in the U.S., includes ten counties in New York 
State, twelve counties in northern and central New Jersey, and one county in 
northeastern Pennsylvania. The idea is that REITs that operate in a market with 
a more diversified mix of industries may be in a better position to re-lease their 
space. 
To construct such a proxy, we first obtain a list of the top ten MSAs that face 
exposure to the bankrupted tenants in each REIT. For each MSA we then calculate 
a Gibbs-Martin diversification index (GMI):5 
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2 6 8 n d L i u 
E x h i b i t 8 | (continued) 
Average BHARs under Different Benchmark Indexes 
1 All REITs 
+ 11 - 1 . 9 0 3 
+ 12 - 2 . 1 7 4 
+ 13 - 2 . 0 8 2 
+ 14 - 2 . 1 1 0 
+ 15 - 2 . 3 8 2 
+ 16 - 2 . 5 1 2 
+ 17 - 1 . 9 4 7 
+ 18 - 2 . 4 4 7 
+ 19 - 2 . 1 3 7 
+20 - 2 . 0 6 0 
+21 - 2 . 1 6 6 
+22 - 2 . 2 5 2 
+23 - 2 . 2 8 7 
+ 24 - 2 . 2 1 6 
Equity REITs Retail REITs 
- 1 . 7 0 2 - 1 . 6 3 2 
-1 .961 - 1 . 9 0 1 
- 1 . 8 7 0 - 1 . 8 1 8 
- 1 . 9 2 2 - 1 . 8 4 8 
- 2 . 1 9 5 - 2 . 0 9 7 
- 2 . 3 0 7 - 2 . 1 3 8 
- 1 . 8 0 4 - 1 . 5 6 8 
- 2 . 2 3 3 - 1 . 9 9 9 
- 2 . 0 1 2 - 1 . 8 2 4 
- 1 . 9 3 1 - 1 . 8 0 8 
- 2 . 0 3 7 - 1 . 9 3 0 
- 2 . 1 3 9 - 2 . 1 0 7 
- 2 . 1 8 4 - 2 . 0 3 8 
- 2 . 0 8 9 - 1 . 9 8 9 
Notes: Exhibit 8 presents the percentage cumulative buy-and-hold abnormal return (BHAR; starting 
from - 3 0 trading day before the event) for 
abnormal return (CAR) on the buy-and-hold 
investment in the sample firm less the return 
appropriate CRSP/Ziman Index. 
various trading day windows. The cumulative 
strategy is calculated as the return on a buy-and-hold 
on a buy-and-hold investment in a portfolio with an 
GMI = 1 
N 
2Et 
(3) 
where Ei is the number of employees in each industry category of a particular 
MSA. Doing so makes it possible for us to measure the extent of local real estate 
market diversification and industry concentration. If the labor force is concentrated 
in a single industry, then the index is zero. 
Our hypothesis is that malls and shopping centers situated in markets with more 
diversified economic bases are less likely to be affected by the liquidation of their 
key tenants, since an increased likelihood exists that the re-tenanting growth option 
is in the money. Retail REITs whose properties are located in markets with a 
A R e t a i l R e a l E s t a t e P e r s p e c t i v e | 2 6 9 
E x h i b i t 9 | Average Abnormal Return Following a Tenant Bankruptcy 
Exhibit 9 presents the abnormal returns averaged across the 160 observations following the Chapter 1 1 bank-
ruptcy filing of a major tenant. 
higher GMI index (higher diversification of the local industry mix) will experience 
a smaller negative effect (or even a positive effect) on their stock performance 
following a tenant bankruptcy event. 
In summary, we run the following step-wise multivariate OLS regression: 
ARit = a + b ^ (Exposure „) + b2(Sizeit) + b3(Marketit) 
+ b4(GMIit) + b5(Anchorit) + b6(Controls^ + ein (4) 
where a and eit are a constant and an error term, respectively; ARjt is the cumulative 
abnormal return (CARs and BHARs) for firm i over the window period; Exposure 
is the total percentage of tenant revenue contribution to its landlord at the time of 
tenant bankruptcy; Size is the natural logarithm of the average square feet of each 
REIT's shopping centers; Market is the market return computed as the total return 
on the value-weighted REIT/Ziman Index; GMI is the Industry Diversification 
ratio computed as the average Gibbs-Martin Index from REIT major markets with 
bankrupted tenants; Anchor is the dummy variable that equals one if the 
bankrupted tenant is an anchor for more than half of the landlord's centers and 
zero otherwise.6 We separately estimate CARs and BHARs for various post-event 
windows of interest, including day 0 to day +1, day 0 to day +2, day 0 to day 
+5, and day 0 to day +30. 
J R E R I V o l . 3 5 I N o . 3 - 2 0 1 3 
E x h i b i t 10 | Stock Price Response to Tenant Bankruptcy 
Trading Days N 
Event Date 161 
0 to +1 159 
O t o + 4 161 
CAR 
Market Model Constant Return Model 
- 0 . 4 3 4 * * - 1 . 1 8 1 * * * 
- 2 . 2 2 8 - 3 . 8 1 9 
- 0 . 7 6 0 * * * - 1 . 5 1 0 * * * 
- 2 . 7 6 3 - 3 . 4 2 7 
- 1 . 3 4 5 * * * - 2 . 5 2 3 * * * 
- 2 . 8 1 9 - 3 . 3 3 0 
Notes: Mean estimates of CARs and BHARs, their f-statistics (in the row below mean estimates), 
event windows following a tenant bankruptcy event. Event date is the date of bankruptcy filing. 
BHAR 
All REIT Equity REIT Retail REIT 
0.502** - 0 . 3 9 3 * * - 0 . 3 2 7 * 
- 2 . 3 9 5 - 1 . 9 9 0 - 1 . 7 5 4 
- 0 . 6 8 4 * * * - 0 . 6 6 6 * * * - 0 . 5 5 1 * * 
- 2 . 6 2 8 - 2 . 5 9 5 - 2 . 2 1 7 
- 0 . 9 3 3 * - 0 . 8 7 8 * - 0 . 7 0 2 
- 1 . 8 1 6 - 1 . 7 2 4 - 1 . 4 5 6 
and number of observations are shown for various post-
0 to +1 is two-day returns after the event, while 0 to + 4 is 
5-day cumulative return. CARs are estimated using both the market model and the constant return model. BHARs are estimated with three REIT indexes as 
expected return: the All REIT lnde> 
'Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
" 'S igni f icant at the 1% level. 
from Ziman, the Equity REIT Index, and the Retail REIT lnde> 
A R e t a i l R e a l E s t a t e P e r s p e c t i v e I 2 7 1 
E x h i b i t 11 | REIT Risk Dynamics Before and After Major Tenant Bankruptcy 
Trading Days 
- 9 0 to - 6 0 
- 6 0 to - 3 0 
- 3 0 to 0 
0 to +30 
Trading Days 
- 9 0 to - 6 0 
- 6 0 to - 3 0 
- 3 0 toO 
0 to +30 
Trading Days 
- 9 0 to - 6 0 
- 6 0 to - 3 0 
- 3 0 to 0 
0 to + 3 0 
BHAR Return Volatility0 
Volatility 
0.065 
0.067 
0.069 
0.070 
Range 
(0.016,0.495) 
(0.016,0.530) 
(0.015,0.329) 
(0.014,0.401) 
BHAR Return Volatility 
Dynamics'3 
Volatility Range 
0.065 
0.066 
0.068 
0.069 
(0.016,0.495) 
(0.016,0.526) 
(0.015,0.323) 
(0.014,0.398) 
BHAR Return Volatility 
Dynamics' 
Volatility Range 
0.065 
0.068 
0.070 
0.070 
Notes: Exhibit 11 reports a ris 
bankruptcy event involving the 
annualized standard deviation 
"Benchmark to all REITs. 
b
 Benchmark to equity REITs. 
'Benchmark to retail REITs. 
(0.014,0.484) 
(0.014,0.526) 
(0.015,0.313) 
(0.013,0.381) 
Trading Days 
- 9 0 to - 3 0 
- 3 0 to +30 
Trading Days 
- 9 0 to - 3 0 
- 3 0 to + 3 0 
Trading Days 
- 9 0 to - 3 0 
- 3 0 to + 3 0 
BHAR Return Volatility 
Dynamics" 
Volatility Range 
0.048 
0.050 
(0.012,0.360) 
(0.012, 0.252) 
BHAR Return Volatility 
Dynamics'3 
Volatility Range 
0.048 
0.050 
(0.012,0.358) 
(0.012,0.251) 
BHAR Return Volatility 
Dynamics' 
Volatility Range 
0.048 
0.050 
< measure of REIT stock abnormal return before anc 
REIT's major tenants. The risk dynamics is measurec 
of BHAR for various windows. 
(0.011,0.353) 
(0.010,0.240) 
after a 
as the 
. 
E m p i r i c a l Resu l t s 
Exhibit 7 presents the average percentage of ARs and CARs (starting from trading 
day -30 , before the event) for various trading day windows. The constant return 
model applies the mean of historical returns as the normal performance for the 
security of interest. The market model uses fitted values from a market model 
regression to indicate normal performance. Exhibit 8 presents the percentage of 
J R E R V o l . 3 5 N o 2 0 
2 7 2 L i u a n d L i u 
Exhibit 12 | Summary Statistics and Correlation Matrix 
Panel A: Summary statistics 
Variable 
CAR 
BHAR 
Size (average s.f. in logs) 
Exposure {%) 
Market 
GMI 
Mean 
-0.008 
-0.007 
11.445 
4.235 
-0.007 
0.909 
Std. Dev. 
0.034 
0.032 
1.258 
7.663 
0.031 
0.006 
Min. 
-0.281 
-0.259 
7.290 
0 
-0.087 
0.894 
Max. 
0.098 
0.150 
15.847 
60 
0.093 
0.919 
Panel B: Pearson correlation matrix 
Variable 
CAR 
BHAR 
Size (average s.f. in logs) 
Exposure {%) 
Market 
GMI 
CAR 
1 
0.943 
0.090 
-0.063 
0.379 
0.217 
BHAR 
1 
0.082 
-0.082 
0.293 
0.189 
Size 
1 
0.038 
0.248 
0.122 
Exposure 
1 
0.053 
0.089 
Market GMI 
1 
0.161 1 
Notes: Exhibit 12 reports summary statistics and Pearson correlations of variables used in the 
cross-sectional regressions. CAR and BHAR are two-day CARs calculated via the market model 
and the buy-and-hold strategy, respectively. Size is the natural logarithm of average square feet of 
each of a REIT's shopping centers. Exposure is the total percentage of tenant revenue contribution 
to a landlord at the time of tenant bankruptcy. Market is the market return of a value-weighted 
REIT market index. GMI is the Industry Diversification ratio computed as the average Gibbs-Martin 
Index from REIT major markets with bankrupted tenants. The number of observations is 157. 
cumulative BHARs (starting from trading day -30 , before the event) for various 
trading day windows. The CAR from the BHAR is calculated by subtracting the 
return on a buy-and-hold investment in a sample firm from the return on a buy-
and-hold investment in a portfolio with an appropriate CRSP/Ziman Index. 
Exhibit 9 displays a visual representation of the CARs. Even though CARs and 
BHARs are both negative and decreasing before the bankruptcy event window, 
the negative landlord stock price responses during the event days are highly 
significant. Consistent with past event studies, the two-day event window contains 
the most significant CAR. 
Key statistics on the CARs and BHARs are shown in Exhibit 10 for various post-
event windows following a tenant bankruptcy, with the event date as the date of 
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E x h i b i t 13 | (continued) 
Cross-sectional Analysis of Abnormal Performance of Landlord Stocks following a Tenant Bankruptcy 
(2000-20101 
Notes: Exhibit 13 presents the multivariate OLS regression results from a cross-sectional analysis of 
REIT abnormal returns using a sample of 157 observations from 2000 to 2010. The dependent 
variables are REIT two-day CARs following a tenant bankruptcy. The dependent variable in Panel 
A is computed via the CAR market model, while the dependent variable in Panel B is computed 
via its BHAR model with the All REIT Index as the benchmark. The regression equation is CAR = 
constant + ^(Exposure) + b2(Size) + b3[Market) + b4{GMI) + b5[Anchor) + ^(Controls) + e. 
Exposure is the total percentage of tenant revenue contribution to a landlord at the time of tenant 
bankruptcy. Size is the natural logarithm of the average square feet of each of a REIT's shopping 
centers. Market is the market return on the value-weighted REIT market index. GMI is the Industry 
Diversification ratio computed as the average Gibbs-Martin Index from major REIT markets with 
bankrupted tenants. Anchor is a dummy variable, which equals one if a bankrupt tenant is an 
anchor tenant for more than half of its landlord's centers and zero otherwise. Heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are shown in the row below the coefficient. 
'Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
the bankruptcy filing. We define a two-day return and a five-day return as 0 to 
+ 1 and 0 to +4, respectively. We use both the market model and the constant 
return model to estimate CARs, while we use three REIT indices (All REITs, 
Equity REITs, and Retail REITs) from Ziman to estimate BHARs. The null 
hypotheses of no abnormal returns at the post-event windows are strongly rejected 
across all model specifications. Furthermore, the abnormal return is more negative 
(more than 25%) using all REIT stocks as the benchmark than it is when using 
retail REITs as the benchmark. This result shows that a tenant bankruptcy affects 
not only its landlords but the entire retail REIT sector. In contrast to previous 
event studies, which use pre-event variance estimation to form a /-statistic, we 
utilize the post-event variance estimation to calculate /-statistics. As bankruptcy 
events create greater uncertainty, one should expect the post-event volatility to be 
greater than that of a pre-event window (we verify this subsequently). Therefore, 
our f-statistics avoid the problem of over-rejecting the null hypothesis. 
Exhibit 11 reports a risk measure of a REIT's abnormal returns before and after 
a bankruptcy event for (a) major tenant(s). The risk dynamics are measured as the 
annualized volatility (or standard deviation) of the BHAR for various event 
windows. Consistent across benchmark return measures, the volatility of abnormal 
returns in the post-bankruptcy window is much higher relative to what it is in the 
pre-bankruptcy window. For example, the volatility for the -90 to -60 day (pre-
bankruptcy) window is 0.065, which increases to 0.070 for the 0 to +30 day 
(post-bankruptcy) window. 
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E x h i b i t 14 | (continuedl 
Cross-sectional Analysis of Abnormal Performance of Landlord Stocks Following a Tenant Bankruptcy 
(2000-2006) 
This table presents the multivariate OLS regression results from a cross-sectional analysis of REIT 
abnormal returns using a sample of 102 observations from 2000 to 2006. The dependent 
variables are REIT two-day cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) following a tenant bankruptcy. The 
dependent variable in Panel A is computed via the CAR market model, while the dependent 
variable in Panel B is computed via its BHAR model with the All REIT Index as the benchmark. The 
regression equation is CAR = constant + b^Exposure) + D2(S/ze) + b3(Market) + b4(GMI) + 
bs{Anchor) + b6[Controls) + e. Exposure is the total percentage of tenant revenue contribution to 
a landlord at the time of tenant bankruptcy. Size is the natural logarithm of the average square 
feet of each of a REIT's shopping centers. Market is the market return on the value-weighted REIT 
market index. GMI is the Industry Diversification ratio computed as the average Gibbs-Martin 
Index from major REIT markets with bankrupted tenants. Anchor is a dummy variable, which 
equals one if a bankrupt tenant is an anchor tenant for more than half of its landlord's centers and 
zero otherwise. Heteroscedasticity-consistent standard errors are shown in the row below the 
coefficient. 
'Significant at the 10% level. 
"Signif icant at the 5% level. 
*** Significant at the 1% level. 
To investigate cross-sectional differences in the abnormal returns in the post-event 
window, we run a multivariate OLS regression, following equation 4. Exhibit 12 
provides the sample summary statistics and Pearson correlation matrix for the 
control variables. Exhibit 13 reports the regression results for CAR two-day 
returns using the market model (Panel A) and the BHAR two-day return using all 
REITs as the benchmark index (Panel B) with three step-wise regression models 
and two interactive-term regression models. Two panels of Exhibit 14 demonstrate 
similar results regarding the determinants of cross-sectional variations in post-
event abnormal returns. First, conditional on the revenue exposure of a bankrupted 
tenant and the average retail property size of the owner, post-event abnormal 
returns are positively associated with market returns (Market). In a good economy 
(in which market returns are high), a tenant bankruptcy has a less negative or 
more positive effect on a landlord firm's stock returns. This result is consistent 
with the growth option hypothesis, according to which landlord REITs may lease 
vacant spaces at market rents or select new tenants that are in growth mode whose 
profits will be shared by the landlord via overage rents. Second, industry 
diversification (GMI) is positively associated with post-event abnormal returns. 
Landlords whose properties are located in markets with highly diversified 
economic bases will be more likely to exercise the growth option after a tenant 
vacates a space and thereby experience higher stock returns. Third, if the 
bankrupted tenant is an anchor tenant, the landlord REIT's stock returns are more 
negative. Because the bankruptcy of an anchor tenant will likely trigger a series 
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Exhibit 15 | Cross-sectional Analysis of Abnormal Performance of Landlord Stocks following a Tenant 
Bankruptcy (2007-2010) 
- ^ ^ 1 2 3 4 5 
Panel A: Two-Day CAR 
Constant 0.027 
(0.094) 
Exposure -0.001 
(0.005) 
Size -0.003 
(0.008) 
Market 0.443*** 
(0.157) 
GMI 
Anchor 
Market x Anchor 
Market x GMI 
Adj. R2 0.142 
-1.590 
(1.123) 
-0.003 
(0.005) 
-0.005 
(0.008) 
0.401 ** 
(0.158) 
1.805 
(1.249) 
0.177 
-2.020** 
(0.932) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
-1.1E-04 
(0.007) 
0.503*** 
(0.132) 
2.258** 
(1.036) 
-0.059*** 
(0.012) 
0.449 
-2.035** 
(0.907) 
-0.004 
(0.004) 
0.002 
(0.007) 
0.242 
(0.187) 
2.242** 
(1.009) 
-0.050*** 
(0.013) 
0.474* 
(0.246) 
0.488 
-1.243 
(1.020) 
-0.005 
(0.004) 
-0.003 
(0.007) 
33.591* 
(19.292) 
1.439 
(1.123) 
-0.059*** 
(0.012) 
-36.371* 
(21.205) 
0.481 
Panel B: Two-Day BHAR 
Constant -0.001 
(0.090) 
Exposure 0.001 
(0.005) 
Size -0.001 
(0.008) 
Market 0.328** 
(0.151) 
GMI 
Anchor 
Market x Anchor 
Market x GMI 
Adj. R2 0.093 
-0.996 
(1.092) 
-2.5E-04 
(0.005) 
-0.002 
(0.008) 
0.302** 
(0.153) 
1.111 
(1.215) 
0.108 
-1 .451* 
(0.865) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.003 
(0.006) 
0.410*** 
(0.123) 
1.590* 
(0.962) 
-0.062*** 
(0.011) 
0.456 
-1.460* 
(0.858) 
-0.002 
(0.004) 
0.005 
(0.006) 
0.238 
(0.177) 
1.579 
(0.954) 
-0.056*** 
(0.012) 
0.312 
(0.233) 
0.476 
-0.790 
(0.952) 
-0.003 
(0.004) 
0.001 
(0.006) 
28.571 
(17.999) 
0.893 
(1.047) 
-0.062*** 
(0.011) 
-30.955 
(19.785) 
0.483 
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E x h i b i t 15 | (continued] 
Cross-sectional Analysis of Abnormal Performance of Landlord Stocks following a Tenant Bankruptcy 
(2007-2010) 
This table presents the multivariate OLS regression results from a cross-sectional analysis of REIT 
abnormal returns using a sample of 55 observations from 2007 to 2010. The dependent variables 
are REIT two-day CARs foil owing a tenant bankruptcy. The dependent variable in Panel A is 
computed via the CAR market model, while the dependent variable in Panel B is computed via its 
BHAR model with the All REIT Index as the benchmark. The regression equation is CAR = constant 
+ ^(Exposure) + b2(Size) + b2[Market) + b4[CMI) + b5[Anchor) + b6[Controh) + e. Exposure 
is the total percentage of tenant revenue contribution to a landlord at the time of tenant 
bankruptcy. Size is the natural logarithm of the average square feet of each of a REIT's shopping 
centers. Market is the market return on the value-weighted REIT market index. GMI is the Industry 
Diversification ratio computed as the average Gibbs-Martin Index from major REIT markets with 
bankrupted tenants. Anchor is a dummy variable, which equals one if a bankrupt tenant is an 
anchor tenant for more than half of its landlord's centers and zero otherwise. Heteroscedasticity-
consistent standard errors are shown in the row below the coefficient. 
'Significant at the 10% level. 
** Significant at the 5% level. 
" 'S igni f icant at the 1% level. 
of co-tenancy clause exercises by inline tenants, an anchor-tenant default will 
create a domino effect of tenant closures or rent-reduction negotiations and thus 
lead to deep negative stock price responses to the landlord firm. Model 4 adds an 
interaction term between Market and Anchor in the regression, which is 
significantly positively associated with REIT abnormal return. The departure of 
an anchor tenant from a center is good news if it is a hot market, because the 
owner is likely to exercise the growth option in such a market. Model 5 adds an 
interaction term between Market and GMI, which is significantly negatively 
associated with REIT abnormal returns. In a cold market (one with lower market 
return), owners are more likely to exercise the growth option if their properties 
are in higher-quality locations. 
To check the robustness of our regression results on landlord cross-sectional 
abnormal returns following a tenant bankruptcy, we test whether the abnormal 
responses of a landlord's stock price to tenant bankruptcy differs between a public 
tenant and a private tenant. In an unreported regression result, in which we include 
a dummy variable indicating a public tenant, we find that the public dummy 
variable is insignificant. To test stock market responses in a hot market versus 
those in a cold market, we split the sample into two periods: 2000-2006 (Exhibit 
14) and 2007-2010 (Exhibit 15). The results concerning the role of location 
quality (GMI) and Anchor tenant amplification effect reported from Exhibit 12 are 
preserved. In addition, we observe that, during a period of strong economic growth 
(before 2007), the REIT negative abnormal returns are more properly aligned with 
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their tenant exposure and less affected by the market returns. During a market 
recession, however (e.g., during 2007-2010), REIT returns are correlated with the 
market to a much greater degree. 
C o n c l u s i o n s 
We analyze the interdependence and resulting feedback effects for firms having 
economic linkages with one another. In particular, we focus on the risk and return 
performance of landlords in a retail real estate setting when a key tenant declares 
bankruptcy and leaves a center using an event study methodology. Retail REITs 
provide an ideal laboratory to test the landlord-tenant feedback effect since the 
contracting mechanism associated with retail leases includes several options such 
as percentage rents and co-tenancy provisions that are unique to retail property. 
Moreover, the landlord in a retail setting attempts to create an optimal tenant mix 
vis-a-vis aggregating tenants from various industries that rely on retail stores to 
market their products. Given the aggregation process, the performance of the 
landlord reflects the joint intra-industry effect of contagion and inter-industry 
competition for retail space. 
Ex ante, we argue that the stock price performance of a landlord will depend on 
which feedback effect dominates given the departure of an anchor or key tenant 
from a retail center. The three feedback effects include the (1) direct effect from 
tenant revenue losses—losing rental revenue on the space that the retailer 
occupies; (2) contagion and the anchor tenant amplification effect arising in part 
from co-tenancy clauses and going dark provisions, as well as the adverse 
consequences when one tenant's action spreads across the industry, which implies 
a positive default correlation; and (3) the growth option with tenant competitive 
effects, which benefit the landlord if below market rents of the departing tenant 
can be adjusted upwards without sacrificing tenant quality. 
In general, we find that there a negative abnormal return, along with increased 
volatility to the common stock of the landlord given the departure of a key tenant. 
When we investigate cross-sectional differences in abnormal returns, we find that 
post-event abnormal returns are positively associated with market returns 
conditional on the revenue exposure of a bankrupted tenant and the average size 
of a landlord's retail property. In a good economy wherein market returns are 
high, a tenant bankruptcy has a less negative or a more positive effect on a landlord 
firm's stock returns. This result is consistent with the growth option hypothesis. 
Intuitively, the landlord (the REIT) may lease vacant spaces at market rents or 
select new tenants that are in a growth mode thus sharing tenant profits via overage 
rents. Second, industry diversification (GMI) is positively associated with post-
event abnormal returns. Landlords whose properties are located in markets with 
highly diversified economic bases are more likely to exercise the growth option 
after a tenant vacates a space thereby experiencing higher stock returns. Third, if 
the bankrupt tenant is an anchor tenant, the landlord REIT's stock returns are 
more negative since the bankruptcy of an anchor tenant will likely trigger a series 
of co-tenancy clause exercises by inline tenants. An anchor-tenant default can 
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create a domino effect of tenant closures or rent-reduction negotiations and thus 
lead to deep negative stock price responses to the landlord firm. 
To test stock market responses in a hot market versus those in a cold market, we 
split the sample into a hot market period (2000-2006) and a cold market period 
(2007-2010). The results concerning the role of location quality (GMI) and anchor 
tenant amplification effect are similar to the base case. In addition, we observe 
that, during a period of strong economic growth (prior to 2007), the negative 
abnormal returns of retail REITs are more properly aligned with their tenant 
exposure and less affected by the market returns. During a market recession, 
however (e.g., during 2007-2010), REIT returns are correlated with the stock 
market to a much greater extent. 
End n o t e s 
1
 A major tenant bankruptcy impacts all firms in the retail REIT sector. Therefore we use 
different REIT indexes as the benchmarks in measuring abnormal performance. We 
observe overall negative abnormal return following tenant bankruptcy, even when we 
benchmark it using a retail REIT index. 
2
 We take the lease contract structure as given and do not focus on the determinants of 
rents in shopping centers. Examples of such studies include Benjamin, Boyle, and 
Sirmans (1990, 1992), Sirmans and Guidry (1993), Des Rosiers, Theriault, and Menetrier 
(2005), and Gould, Pashigian, and Prendergast (2007). 
3
 See Moody's Investor Service (2004). 
4
 See, for example, Collier International (2010). 
5
 Applying the methodology of Gibbs and Martin (1962), Corgel and Gay (1987) study 
mortgage default probability across MSAs. The GMI equals one minus the Herfindahl-
Hirschman Index (HHI). 
6
 The definition of Anchor is ad hoc. However, the results remain the same once we use 
different definitions. Other tenanting strategies may also influence the shopping center 
performance. Yuo and Lizieri (2013) use the degree of departmentalization and spatial 
complexity to measure the tenant placement strategy. Anikeeff (1996) emphasizes the 
importance of tenant selection and tenant mix in predicting shopping center 
performances. Our sample does not contain such detailed information on tenant mix and 
property floor plans. 
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